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An Efficiency-Wage Theory of the Weather 
Many  people  have  noticed  that  it's getting  too  hot  lately.  But  most 
suggested  remedies  have been micro oriented  and have neglected  the 
role of  macro  policies.  To  see how these  policies  would  work, I con- 
struct  a  simple  macroeconomic  theory  based  on  efficiency  wages.' 
This  choice  of  framework  is  natural  because  the  efficiency-wage 
model has already been successful in analyzing unemployment,  which 
is another  social problem.  The  adaptation of the model to the weather 
suggests  that many other  applications  would  also be fruitful. 
The  key observation  is that workers' supply  of  effort  depends  on 
their wage,  relative to that available elsewhere,  and on the temperature. 
If firm i employs Ni workers, the effective  supply of labor input can be 
written  as 
L- =  N- .f(w-  -  -w,  )(1) 
where wi is the firm's wage rate, w is the wage paid by other firms, and 
T is the temperature  (measured  in degrees  Kelvin). Effort is increas- 
ing  in w- -  W and  in  T. (It used  to be  thought  that people  worked 
harder when it got colder, but that view was refuted  by Carnot [1846] 
in his famous rat experiments.)2  Also, as T rises, the marginal effect of 
w- - -  on effort  diminishes;  that is, if it gets really hot, people  work a 
lot and  pay little attention  to the wage. 
Each firm chooses  wi, given  -w and T, to maximize profits or, equiva- 
lently, to minimize  the costs of providing  a given amount  of effective 
I have benefited  from  discussions  of  this research  with Jason  Barro. 
l  For a related  analysis based on  the reserve  army theory,  see Marx (1885). 
2  Carnot  is  not  a  misspelling  of  Cournot,  but  is  instead  the  name  of  the  French 
engineer  who  discovered  the  second  law of  thermodynamics.  Carnot  found  that rats 
moved  around  more and more briskly as he turned up the heat, although  his apparatus 
allowed  a maximum  temperature  of only  3120  K. As he reduced  the temperature,  the 
rats became  more and more lazy and stopped  moving entirely at 230?. Carnot was also 
the first to discover a form of hysteresis in animal behavior.  If he reduced  the tempera- 
ture to 2300,  the  rats failed  to move  even  if he restored  the temperature  to 3120. 
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labor  input.  Consequently,  as  is  familiar  from  the  efficiency-wage 
literature,  the optimizing  firm operates  where  the elasticity of effort 
with  respect  to w, is unity.  This  condition  implies  that the  firm sets 
w,-  as a decreasing  function  of  T: 
wi -w  =  h  (T),  Ah  I<  O.  (2) 
I assume  that w- >  Ub  if T  =  0 (which requires  some  additional  weak 
conditions  about the  functionf)  in eq. [1]). 
Suppose  that  all firms  and  workers  are  identical,  so  that w,  =  -w 
holds  in equilibrium.  Then  the equilibrium  temperature,  denoted  by 
T*, is determined  by 
h(T*)  =  0.  (3) 
Given the properties  of the function  h(),  which follow from  those of 
f(Q)  in equation  (1), equation  (3) has two immediate  implications.  First, 
the  temperature  is positive  in equilibrium,  T*  >  0,  and  second,  the 
temperature  exceeds  the Pareto-optimal  value. That is, it is too hot on 
average.  Some  simple  extensions  would  make  the  model  consistent 
with  two other  empirical  observations:  namely,  it is typically hotter 
during  the day than at night,  and  the temperature  follows  a regular 
seasonal  pattern.  However,  further  research is needed  to understand 
the  absence  of  a  systematic  pattern  in  the  temperature  during 
weekends  and  holidays.3 
In a secular context,  rising real income  tends  to induce  shirking  if 
leisure  is a normal  good.  A steadily  rising temperature  (the "green- 
house  effect")  motivates  workers  to stay diligent.  Therefore,  instead 
of being  a cause of concern,  this effect  is an example  of the efficient 
working  of  the market. 
The  role for policy comes  from the government's  ability to shift the 
effort  function,f(Q), in equation  (1) and thereby affect the equilibrium 
temperature,  T*. The  government  has a variety of  instruments  that 
would induce  people  to expend  more effort  on the job.  For example, 
it is well known that budget  deficits encourage  hard work (see Ricardo 
1821). Therefore,  an expansionary  fiscal policy would cool things off. 
This result can explain  why Latin countries  tend to have large budget 
deficits and  high  average  temperatures.  Similarly, the model  can ex- 
plain  why  Scandinavian  countries  tend  to  have  high  marginal  tax 
rates and  low average  temperatures. 
3 One  hint  on  how  to  proceed  is  that  weekends  did  not  apply  in  ancient  Rome. 
Friedman  (1987)  discussed  the determination  of indoor  temperature.  The  weakness of 
his otherwise  elegant  theory is the treatment of outdoor  temperature  as exogenous.  For 
example,  he left unexplained  the observation  that average winter temperatures  in Los 
Angeles  are higher  than those  in Chicago.  (Such gaps in economic  analysis amount  to 
an open  invitation to sociologists.)  The  present  theory can readily explain  the patterns 
in the weather  across cities or regions. MISCELLANY  1001 
Some economists  will probably think that the efficiency-wage  model 
is a bizarre theory of  the weather.  But experts  in the efficiency-wage 
area  will  already  have  recognized  that  the  analysis  of  the  weather 
parallels the  usual  treatment  of  unemployment.  In fact, substitution 
of  U for  T yields  the  standard  efficiency-wage  model  of  unemploy- 
ment.  It  seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  approach  is just  as 
valuable  for  analyzing  the  weather  as it is for understanding  unem- 
ployment.4 
ROBERTJ.  BARRO 
Harvard University 
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